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h i g h l i g h t s
• We study head starts in dynamic two-player tournaments a la Lazear and Rosen (1981).
• A principal values aggregate effort and the highest effort exerted by the players.
• It is always optimal to bias the tournament by awarding a head start.
• A small head start increases the highest effort without decreasing aggregate effort.
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a b s t r a c t
In promotion contests or other tournament-like situations, a principal may attach some value to the highest effort expended by an agent. We 
show that whenever agents interact over multiple periods, awarding a head start to one of them is optimal even with completely symmetric 
agents. Awarding a small head start increases maximum individual effort without decreasing aggregate effort.1. Introduction
Awarding a head start is typically considered an affirmative
action policy which serves to level the playing field between
ex-ante unequal players. A small literature on contests and
tournaments analyzes the effect of such affirmative action on
asymmetric competitors’ performances, see e.g. Franke (2012)
and Kirkegaard (2012) We show that a principal may also wish
to award a head start with completely identical competitors –
i.e. to ‘unlevel’ the playing field – when he attaches some value
✩ We would like to thank Bauke Visser as well as an anonymous referee for
insightful comments and suggestions. Philipp Denter gratefully acknowledges the
support from the Ministerio Economia y Competitividad (Spain) through grants
ECO2014-55953-P and MDM 2014-0431. Of course, all errors are our own.∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: pdenter@eco.uc3m.es (P. Denter), sisak@ese.eur.nl (D. Sisak).to the highest individual effort. Situations where this might be an
appealing goal include for example sports competition, where only
the felt enjoyment of the spectators matters.
The intuition underlying our results is the following. Fierceness
of competition in the final period diminishes with the advantage
an agent has achieved over the other. An agent that has been
given a head start early on thus has an incentive to work harder
than her opponent to retain and increase her lead. The reward
for her extra effort is reduced competition and thus lower cost
of effort in the future. We show that the introduction of a small
head start increases the favored individual’s effort at the beginning
of the tournament (and reduces the effort of the disadvantaged
individual) while having only second-order effects on effort at the
end of the tournament.1
1 Other literature analyzing head starts in tournaments are Lazear and Rosen
(1981), Konrad (2009), Klein and Schmutzler (forthcoming), Siegel (2014), Seel and1
The paper is closely related to Drugov and Ryvkin (forthcoming)
and Meyer (1992). Drugov and Ryvkin (forthcoming) study a
one-shot contest with a general technology (contest success
function) and provide conditions under which biasing a contest
with symmetric players is beneficial for a principal with goals
such as the maximization of aggregate effort, the highest effort, or
the highest winning effort. In contrast, we study a dynamic two-
stage game with observation errors between symmetric players.
We show thatwith the introduction of dynamics, a small head start
always benefits the principal, regardless of the relative importance
of highest and aggregate effort (but assuming the weight on
aggregate effort is smaller than 1), even when no head-start
would be strictly optimal in the static or one-shot game. Thus,
our paper complements their analysis by showing how dynamic
considerations may increase the value of biasing a contest for a
principal. Meyer (1992) also considers a dynamic setting where
two identical contestants compete in two subsequent contests. She
finds that a principalmaximizing aggregate effort should introduce
a bias in the second contest in favor of the first contest winner.
This increases the value of winning in contest one and thus efforts
in the first period at the expense of efforts in the second period.
In contrast to our setting, the bias is endogenously determined
by first period outcomes. We show that introducing a bias that is
completely exogenous also may benefit the principal.
Themodel is closely related to those in Denter and Sisak (2015),
Aoyagi (2010), or Ederer (2010), all of which study dynamic (two-
stage) tournamentmodels à la Lazear and Rosen (1981) or Nalebuff
and Stiglitz (1983). The distinctive feature of the current model is
to focus on head starts in tournaments.
2. Model
Two agents, i = A, B, compete for a prize of common value
v = 1 (e.g. a bonus or promotion) over two stages, t = 1, 2. In
each stage, each agentmay exert costly effort xti ≥ 0 to increase her
chances of receiving the prize. At the end of stage 2, the difference
in observed cumulative effort determines the chance of success.
The principal values both the agents’ aggregate efforts as well
as the greatest individual effort exerted.2 Hence, if X denotes
aggregate effort and x˜ the greatest individual cumulative effort,3
the principal seeks to maximize
π = λX + (1− λ)x˜.
λ ∈ [0, 1) is a weight the principal assigns to aggregate effort.4
The principal need not put a positive weight on X for our results to
hold. We only need λ < 1.
The principal may bias the tournament in favor of one agent
by awarding a head start. Such a head start increases an agent’s
cumulative effort and through this her chance of success, but
does not enter π . Denote the head start by h ≥ 0. Without
loss of generality assume the head start is awarded to agent A.
Agent i’s effort at t , xti , comes at costs C(x
t
i ), where we assume
C ′(x) > 0 for all x > 0, C ′(0) = 0, and C ′′(x) > 0.
Throughoutweassume that the cost function is sufficiently convex,
Wasser (2014), and Stracke (2013). Kawamura and de Barreda (2014) also highlight
the desirability of head starts with (ex-ante) symmetric players though in their
framework the principal is concerned with selection while in ours he is interested
in effort.
2 The principal may as well try to maximize the expected effort of the winner.
However, it can be shown that in out framework this does not change results at all
and we hence abstain from modelling this goal explicitly.
3 Formally, x˜ = max x1A + x2A, x1B + x2B.
4 Technically speaking, a concern for the greatest individual effort may reflect a
best-shot production technology. This arises naturally if agents work on individual
projects and only the best of these is implemented by the principal.i.e. that C ′′(x) is sufficiently large. This ensures both existence
and uniqueness of equilibrium, see for example Denter and Sisak
(2015). In Assumption 1 in Appendix A.1 we specify an exact
condition guaranteeing uniqueness.
Define
X1A = h+ x1A, X2A = h+ x1A + x2A
X1B = x1B, X2B = x1B + x2B.
Thus, X = X2A+X2B−h. X1A and X1B are observed by the agents before
their choice of effort in stage two x2i , i = A, B, for example because
they work alongside each other. The principal awards the prize
after observing X2A and X
2
B to the agent with the higher aggregate
effort (including head start). However, his evaluation is noisy and
disturbed by an additive observation error ϵ with density f (ϵ)
(and cdf F(ϵ)) that is differentiable, quasi-concave and symmetric
around zero.5 Hence, the principal observes X2A−X2B−ϵ rather than
the true value X2A − X2B . Thus in contrast to the agents the principal
only imperfectly observes effort.
Given the set-up, agent A receives the prize with probability
Pr[X2A − X2B > ϵ] = F(X2A − X2B ).
3. Optimal head start
We solve the two-stage game by backward induction. At the
beginning of stage 2, agents observe and condition their decision
on
∆2 = h+ x1A − x1B (1)
as solely the difference in efforts is relevant for the principal’s
decision of whom to award the prize. Individual payoffs in the
second stage are
π2A = F(∆2 + x2A − x2B)− C(x2A)
π2B = 1− F(∆2 + x2A − x2B)− C(x2B).
Assuming the variance of the noise term ϵ is sufficiently large or
the cost function is sufficiently convex, the agents’ payoff functions
are strictly concave.6The unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is
symmetric and given by
x2A = x2B = x2(∆2) = C ′−1

f (∆2)

,
see for example Denter and Sisak (2015). The intuition for this
result is as follows: The marginal increase in the probability to
come out ahead is identical for both and equal to f (∆2 + x2A − x2B).
Given identical and strictly increasingmarginal cost functions, this
implies x2A = x2B = x2(∆2) in the unique equilibrium. Because
C ′(0) = 0, x2(∆2) > 0 whenever f (∆2) > 0.
By quasi-concavity of the density function f and symmetry
around zero, individual and aggregate effort is always maximal
when both agents are evenly matched in the second period (∆2 =
0). Thus, considering only the second period, a head start always
reduces both individual and aggregate effort.
Given the stage 2 subgame equilibrium, expected equilibrium
payoffs from that stage are
π2A = F(∆2)− C(x2(∆2))
π2B = 1− F(∆2)− C(x2(∆2))
5 Note that we could equivalently let the principal choose a biased observation
error.
6 For example, if C(x) = c2 x2 and noise is normal with variance σ 2 , we need that
c σ 2 > (2eπ)−1/2 .
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yielding expected stage 1 payoffs corresponding to
π1A = F(∆2)− C(x2(∆2))− C(x1A)
π1B = 1− F(∆2)− C(x2(∆2))− C(x1B).
The focus of the paper is to show that a positive bias is optimal if the
principal values the greatest individual effort (λ < 1). To show this
we proceed as follows. First, we assume the head start to be zero,
h = 0.We then solve the first stage and determine the equilibrium.
Then we determine comparative statics around h = 0.
Taking the first order conditions with respect to an agent’s own
effort yields
∂π1A
∂x1A
= f (∆2)− C ′(x2(∆2))dx
2(∆2)
d∆2
− C ′(x1A) != 0
∂π1B
∂x1B
= f (∆2)+ C ′(x2(∆2))dx
2(∆2)
d∆2
− C ′(x1B) != 0
(2)
where we already made use of ∂∆
2
∂x1A
= 1 = − ∂∆2
∂x1B
using the
definition of ∆2 in (1). Under Assumption 1 (Appendix A.1) there
exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies which is symmetric
and where x1A = x1B = x1 = C ′−1(f (0)). To see this, observe
that ∆2 = 0 in the symmetric equilibrium with h = 0, and
thus dx
2(∆2)
d∆2
|∆2=0 = 1C ′′(C ′−1(f (0))) f ′(0) = 0, as f ′(0) = 0
by differentiability and symmetry around zero. Note that in this
situation both players choose identical strategies in both stages and
those efforts are also equal across stages, x1 = x2(0). Further note
that the derivative of effort in stage 2 with respect to∆2 is zero at
this point. Hence, we need to show that at least one agent’s effort
increases in stage 1when the principal increases h from zero. Using
Cramer’s rule it is easy to show that ∂x
1
A
∂h

h=0
= − ∂x1B
∂h

h=0
. It hence
remains to be shown that this derivative is non-zero.
Lemma 1.
∂x1A
∂h

h=0
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix. 
We are now able to state our main result:
Proposition 1. The optimal head start is strictly positive, h > 0.
Proof. The principal’s objective function is π(h) = λX(h) + (1 −
λ)x˜(h). Since with h = 0 all efforts are identical, we can take
x˜(h) = x1A(h) + x2A(∆2(h)), thus focussing on player A. Aggregate
effort is X(h) = x1A(h)+ x1B(h)+ 2x2(∆2(h)). Taking the derivative
of π(h)with respect to h yields:
∂π(h)
∂h
= λ

∂x1A(h)
∂h
+ ∂x
1
B(h)
∂h
+ 2f
′(∆2)
C ′′(C ′−1(f (∆2)))

+ (1− λ)

∂x1A(h)
∂h
+ f
′(∆2)
C ′′(C ′−1(f (∆2)))

.
At h = 0 we know that ∂x1A(h)
∂h = −
∂x1B(h)
∂h and that ∆
2 = 0. Since
f ′(0) = 0 the derivative simplifies to
∂π(h)
∂h

h=0
= (1− λ) ∂x
1
A
∂h

h=0
= − (1− λ)f (0)f
′′(0)
[C ′′(x1)]2 + 2f (0)f ′′(0) ,
which is strictly positive by Lemma 1 if λ < 1. Hence, the
principal’s payoff strictly increases in h when h = 0 and the
maximum is attained for some h > 0. Fig. 1. Agent A’s total effort XA(h) = x1A(h)+ x2A(h) as a function of h. Observation
noise is assumed Gaussian with zero mean and standard deviation σ , cost is
quadratic, C(x) = 12 x2 . The solid curve corresponds to σ = 5/6, the dotted to
σ = 1, and the dashed to σ = 6/5.
Giving a head start to player A has no effect on aggregate effort
at the margin, but increases the greatest effort. Hence, it is always
optimal to set a positive head start. This is illustrated in Fig. 1.
4. Discussion
To which degree do our results depend on the specific cost
structure? We assume additive separability of costs over time. In
many situation this is appropriate, such as choice of work effort
in a firm where outlays are not monetary but effort that has to be
exerted every day, month or year. In other situations, however, a
different cost structure may be more appropriate. Let us consider
the other extreme and assume that costs depend only on the sum
of efforts over time, i.e. C(x1+x2). In this case, second stage effort in
an interior solution will always be chosen such that total effort by
both agents is identical, x1A+x2A = x1B+x2B = X . To see this, note that
from the first-order conditionswe get f (∆2+x2A−x2B) = C ′(x1i +x2i )
for both in an interior equilibrium, implying marginal cost in stage
2 must be identical for both. In this type of equilibrium, aggregate
effort is determined uniquely through f (h) = C ′(X∗) ⇔ X∗ =
C ′−1(f (h)), which ismaximizedwhen h = 0. This logic implies that
there always exists an equilibrium, where both individuals invest
first period efforts x1A = x1B = X∗ and do not add any effort in stage
two. Effectively in this equilibrium, the game reduces to a one-shot
game. Hence, the cost structure, and therewith the details of the
problem studied, plays an important role for the optimality of a
head start.
Appendix. Mathematical appendix
A.1. Uniqueness of equilibrium and the cost function
In games like the one we are studying, it is well known that
the cost function needs to be sufficiently convex to guarantee
concavity of the players’ optimization problems (see, e.g., Denter
and Sisak, 2015). We assume this to be the case throughout.
Still, we need another assumption that guarantees uniqueness of
equilibrium:
Assumption 1. Throughout, we assume that for all (x1, x2,∆2) ∈
[0, C−1(1)]2 × R
1 >
K(x2,∆2)
K(x2,∆2)+ C ′′(x1i )[C ′′(x2)]3
> −1,
where
K(x2,∆2) := [C ′′(x2)]2 [f ′(∆2)]2 + f ′′(∆2)f (∆2)
− C ′′′(x2)f (∆2)[f ′(∆2)]2 − [C ′′(x2)]3f ′(∆2).3
The assumption assures that the slope of players’ best response
functions is never greater than 1 in absolute value. For example, if
we assume noise is standard normal and C(x) = 12x2, the condition
holds (and payoffs are also strictly concave).
A.2. Proof of Lemma 1
In Eq. (2) we already derived the players’ first period FOCs. If
h = 0 and there is sufficient noise, i.e. if E[ϵ2] is sufficiently
large, or if C ′′(x) is sufficiently large, there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium in which x1A(0) = x1B(0) = x1 = C ′−1(f (0)) = x2(0).
Thus, in this situation∆2 = 0.
Now we totally differentiate the set of FOCs to obtain
comparative statics results:
∂2π1A
∂(x1A)2

h=0∧x1A=x1B=x1
= − f (0)f
′′(0)
C ′′(x1)
− C ′′(x1)
∂2π1A
∂x1A∂x
1
B

h=0∧x1A=x1B=x1
= f (0)f
′′(0)
C ′′(x1)
∂2π1A
∂x1A∂h

h=0∧x1A=x1B=x1
= f (0)f
′′(0)
C ′′(x1)
and
∂2π1B
∂x1A∂x
1
B

h=0∧x1A=x1B=x1
= f (0)f
′′(0)
C ′′(x1)
∂2π1B
∂(x1B)2

h=0∧x1A=x1B=x1
= − f (0)f
′′(0)
C ′′(x1)
− C ′′(x1)
∂2π1B
∂x1B∂h

h=0∧x1A=x1B=x1
= − f (0)f
′′(0)
C ′′(x1)
where we used that x2(0) = x1 = C ′−1(f (0)) and f ′(0) = 0. Now
define
A =

∂2π1A
∂(x1A)2
∂2π1A
∂x1A∂x
1
B
∂2π1B
∂x1A∂x
1
B
∂2π1B
∂(x1B)2
 ,
Ah,A =

− ∂
2π1A
∂x1A∂h
∂2π1A
∂x1A∂x
1
B
− ∂
2π1B
∂x1B∂h
∂2π1B
∂(x1B)2
 ,and
Ah,B =

∂2π1A
∂(x1A)2
− ∂
2π1A
∂x1A∂h
∂2π1B
∂x1A∂x
1
B
− ∂
2π1B
∂x1B∂h
 .
Comparative statics are then dx
1
A
dh

h=0∧x1A=x1B=x1
= |Ah,A||A| and
dx1B
dh

h=0∧x1A=x1B=x1
= |Ah,B||A| . Using the above expressions and
simplifying yields
dx1A
dh

h=0∧x1A=x1B=x1
= −dx
1
B
dh

h=0∧x1A=x1B=x1
= − f (0)f
′′(0)
C ′′(x1)2 + 2f (0)f ′′(0) > 0.
To see this, note that Assumption 1 reduces to
1 >
f (0)f ′′(0)
[C ′′(x1)]2 + f (0)f ′′(0) > −1
when h = 0, x1(0) = x2(0) and ∆2 = 0, which implies the
inequality.
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